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their store choice between retail stores and a no-purchase alternative based on their utilities from each
category. The common practice of category management (CM) is an example of a decentralized regime
for controlling assortment because each category manager is responsible for maximizing his or her
assigned category’s profit. Alternatively, a retailer can make category decisions across the store with a
centralized regime. We show that CM never finds the optimal solution and provides both less variety and
higher prices than optimal. In a numerical study, we demonstrate that profit loss due to CM can be
significant. Finally, we propose a decentralized regime that uses basket profits, a new metric, rather than
accounting profits. Basket profits are easily evaluated using point-of-sale data, and the proposed method
produces near-optimal solutions.
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Abstract
This paper studies the assortment planning problem with multiple merchandise categories. The categories interact with each other due to the effects of basket shopping consumers. We present a model in which a retailer
chooses the number of variants to oﬀer in each category and the consumers of
multiple categories (i.e., basket shoppers) make their store choice between
the retail store and an exogenous outside alternative based on their total
utilities from their shopping basket. We investigate the interaction of the
category variety decisions at the retail store under centralized and decentralized management regimes. The common practice of category management
is an example of a decentralized regime for controlling assortment because
each category manager is responsible for maximizing his or her assigned category’s profit. We show that category management never finds the optimal
solution and generally provides less variety than optimal. In a numerical
study we demonstrate that the profit loss due to category management can
be significant. We provide guidelines on which type of categories the retailer should carry and which should have more variety. Finally, we propose
a decentralized regime that uses basket profits, a new metric, rather than
accounting profits. Basket profits are easily evaluated from available data
and this method produces near optimal solutions.
∗
The authors would like to thank David Bell, Morris Cohen, Marshall Fisher, Abba
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Retailers have increased product selections in all merchandise categories for a number of possible reasons, including heterogeneous customer preferences, variety seeking consumers and brand
competition: Quelch and Kenny (1994) report that the number of products in the market place
increased by 16% per year between 1985 and 1992 while shelf space expanded only by 1.5% per
year during the same period. This rapid growth in variety has raised questions as to whether it is
excessive. For example, many retailers are adopting an “eﬃcient assortment” strategy, which primarily seeks to find the profit maximizing level of variety by eliminating low-selling products (Kurt
Salmon Associates 1993), and “category management”, which attempts to maximize the profits
within a category (AC Nielsen 1998).

There is even empirical evidence that variety levels have

become so excessive that reducing variety does not decrease sales (Dreze et al. 1994, Broniarcyzk
et al. 1998, Boatwright and Nunes, 2001). And from the perspective of operations within the store
and across the supply chain, it is clear that variety is costly: greater variety can lead to slower
selling inventory, poor product availability, higher handling costs and greater markdown costs.
While there may be agreement that reducing variety can increase short run profits, there is
far less agreement with respect to its impact on long run profits.

Assortment planning models

in the literature, and organizational forms such as category management, focus on the selection
of products in a single category assuming store traﬃc is exogenous, i.e., variety within a category
influences demand conditional on a store visit, but does not influence store choice. However, if,
based on single category analyses, a retailer reduces variety in all categories, then the store becomes
less attractive and some customers are likely to defect to other retailers, thereby reducing store
traﬃc. This concern is particularly relevant with respect to basket shoppers: if a basket shopper
does not find an item that she wants in one category, she may purchase her entire basket from
another retailer. Although retailers are well aware of this issue, there is little research on what to
do about it.
This paper works with a stylized model to develop managerial insights regarding the assortment planning process in an environment with multiple categories. The retailer oﬀers a selection
of products in each merchandise category. Basket shopping consumers choose between the retailer
and an outside alternative to maximize their total shopping utility. The retailer’s decisions across
merchandise categories can be managed under centralized or decentralized regimes. Decentralized
regimes (optimization on a category by category basis), such as category management (CM), are
analytically manageable but they ignore (in their pure form) the impact of cross-category interac-

1

tions. Centralized regimes account for these eﬀects, but only in theory they do so because they are
not implementable in practice: it is extremely diﬃcult to design a model to account for all crosscategory eﬀects, to estimate its parameters with available data and to actually solve it. Chen et al
(1999) also emphasize the need for models that are solvable with parameters that can be estimated
from available data. As CM and centralization are two extremes, merchandising managers often
create an intermediate approach by adding constraints to the planning process based on their own
knowledge about the store’s categories and customers: e.g., include a particular product, have at
least two brands in a subgroup, ensure that the timing and depth of promotions are coordinated
across obviously complementary products (chips and salsa, beer and pretzels, etc.), etc. But it is
not clear if the appropriate constraints are implemented (e.g., should there be at least two brands
or five brands, etc.) or whether all of the necessary interactions are accounted for with this ad-hoc
approach.
We address the following research questions in this paper. What is the loss due to decentralization compared to the optimal solution? (In some cases decentralization may perform well.) Do
decentralized solutions have a consistent bias? (Too much or too little variety.) Is there a way to
have the best of both worlds, i.e., are there easily solvable management regimes, based on readily
available data, that lead to nearly optimal assortments?
We find that the impact of basket shopping consumers on assortment planning is more complex
than one might initially suspect because basket shopping generates two contradictory eﬀects. To
illustrate, consider a supermarket example. Capers, a low penetration, low frequency product is
often not profitable, but customers that buy capers usually buy large baskets of products. Hence,
expanding variety in the spices-condiments category (A) to include capers increases store traﬃc
and sales in some other category (B), i.e., more variety in category A makes adding variety to
category B more attractive because category A might pull in more shoppers to the store (i.e.,
categories are strategic complements). This is an intuitive eﬀect, and it leads to the conclusion
that ignoring interactions leads to less than the optimal amount of variety (capers are not included
in the assortment if you maximize profit in that category alone; they are included only if total
store profit is maximized). However, if category A is very attractive, category B can free ride with
lower variety (i.e., categories are strategic substitutes):

if the spice-condiment category is deep

because of the inclusion of capers, other categories need less variety to attract the same basket
shoppers.

That eﬀect contradicts the initial intuition, hence, maybe decentralized management
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leads to too much variety. In economic models, activities are usually assumed to be (or found
to be) either strategic complements or substitutes, but not both. Our model provides a realistic
counter-example.
We characterize the assortment chosen with a decentralized regime, which we refer to as category management (CM), as well as the assortment with a centralized solution (assuming an ideal
situation in which we are able to estimate all of the demand parameters, solve the problem, etc.).
We show that if there are any basket shoppers, CM never finds the optimal solution and mostly
provides less variety than optimal, even though two categories can be either complements or substitutes depending on their variety levels. With numerical examples we demonstrate that the profit
loss due to CM can be significant, 28% on average. More importantly, the performance gets worse
as the number of categories increases. Our point is that decentralization can be costly if there are
basket shopping consumers and the interactions among categories is not explicitly modeled. To
address the potential problem with a decentralized approach to assortment planning, we propose
a simple heuristic that retains decentralized decision making (category managers optimize their
own categories’ profit) but adjusts how profits are measured. To be specific, instead of using an
accounting measure of a category’s profit, we define a new measure called basket profits. Basket
profits can be estimated using point-of-sale data and it enables CM to approximately measure
the true marginal benefits of merchandising decisions. We believe this analytical approach is an
attractive alternative relative to ad-hoc coordination across category managers.
The next section describes our model, followed by the literature review in Section 2. Section 3
details the consumer choice process and Section 4 presents the solution under diﬀerent management
regimes. Discussion of managerial implications in Section 5 is followed by the heuristic solution in
Section 6, a brief numerical study in Section 7 and concluding remarks in Section 8.

1

Model Basics

Consider a retailer that carries multiple categories of goods (e.g., shirts, ties, sports jackets). The
retailer oﬀers a certain assortment defined by what categories she carries and the selection of
products in each category. The set of categories is denoted J = {1, 2, .., N} and the set of variants
in category j is denoted Sj = {1, 2, .., Ij }. The retailer carries assortment X = (X1 , X2 , .., XJ ),
where Xj ⊂ Sj , for all j. There is an outside alternative (possibly another retailer) that consumers
can choose to do their shopping. The outside alternative carries assortment Z = (Z1 , Z2 , .., ZJ )
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where Zj ⊂ Sj , for all j. In this paper we take the perspective of the retailer and analyze her
decisions X assuming that Z is exogenous. It is worth noting here that the outside alternative can
be interpreted in three meaningful ways:

I1 the retailer’s direct competitor (e.g., the store across the street),
I2 an aggregate representation of the world outside the retailer,
I3 a no purchase option calibrated such that the retailer’s share in the model given X and Z is
the ratio of its current market share to the maximum potential market share it could achieve
by carrying the broadest and deepest possible assortment, Xj = Sj for all j ∈ J.
We make the following assumptions about the retailer’s operations.

The cost of providing

an assortment Xj is Cj (Xj ), which is increasing, convex in Xj and can be parameterized with a
scalar cj such that ∂Cj (cj )/∂cj > 0 (Appendix A describes a realistic replenishment system that
yields convex costs in assortment depth.)

Let pj > 0 be the per-unit margin for all variants in

category j 1 . Consistent with the notation for the assortment decisions, a variable name in bold
letter denotes a vector of those variables; c = (c1 , ..., cN ) and p = (p1 , ..., pN ).
There are diﬀerent types of consumers in the market that are characterized by the contents of
their shopping baskets. Let t be the index to the elements of the power set of J, {B : B ⊆ J}.
Bt ⊂ J denotes a shopping basket that contains categories j ∈ Bt .

The number of type t

consumers in the market is randomly distributed with mean λt . A consumer of type t purchases
exactly one unit of a product from each category in her shopping list Bt . Consumers have perfect
information about the oﬀerings at the retail store and the outside alternative (i.e., X and Z). A
type t consumer systematically evaluates the attractiveness of the retailer, At (X), and the outside
alternative, At (Z), and chooses the alternative that maximizes her total utility from the shopping
experience. Rhee and Bell (2002) show that consumers patronize many stores but they typically
have a primary aﬃliation to a “main store” that captures the majority of their spending.
1

The assumption of identical absolute margins of all variants in a category is restrictive.

The

However, it may be

realistic in certain cases. For example, diﬀerent color/size shirts of the same style have the same price tag. Moreover,
Anderson et al. (1992) and Cattani et al. (2003) prove that when customers follow a MNL choice model, optimal
pricing policy for a group of variants is an identical absolute mark-up policy. This theoretical result fully supports
our assumption.
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choice between the retailer and the outside alternative in our model corresponds to the choice of a
“main store”. Thus, customers in our model do not split their shopping between two stores.

2

Related Literature

Interest in category management (CM) is high. According to a recent industry report, 83% of the
grocery retailers view CM as the most important issue facing them (Progressive Grocer 1996). The
shift from brand-centered management to CM resulted in a more profitable pricing structure by
eliminating the competitive pricing between brands (AC Nielsen 1998, Basuroy et al. 2001, Zenor
1994). Our paper attempts to shift the discussion from brand level to the category level and raises
questions about the interaction among categories.
Chen et al. (1999) also study the impact of basket shopping consumers.

They show that

merchandising decisions should not be governed by accounting profits, but rather by a new construct
they develop called marketing profits. Like us, they argue that simple techniques, based on readily
available data, are needed to guide decision making. However, there are some significant diﬀerences
between their work and ours. In their model each consumer type bases its store choice decision
on the variety of a single category, what they call the lead category. Hence, expanding variety in
category B has no influence on the store choice decision of category A lead customers. In contrast,
our consumers base their decisions on the total utility of their basket, which may include multiple
categories. As a result, there are minimal strategic interactions among categories in their model,
whereas in our model the strategic interactions are strong and lead to both strategic substitutes
and complements. A second key diﬀerence is how they improve decision making. They assume
a store makes optimal shelf space decisions and then infer marketing profit parameters that would
imply those decisions are optimal. They then use those marketing profit estimates to guide other
merchandising decisions, such as advertising allocation.

We use point of sales data to estimate

basket profits, without assuming the retailer’s assortment is optimal, and then derive optimal
assortment decisions in a decentralized regime.
There are many diﬀerent modeling approaches to consumer choice over multiple products. See
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for a review. We follow the approach taken by Guadagni
and Little (1983) and others: we presume each consumer receives a random utility from each item
in the choice set and the highest utility item is chosen. As a result, increasing the breadth and
depth of the assortment in our model increases total demand.
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The findings in Dhar, Hoch and

Kumar (2001) are generally consistent with that assumption.

However, we recognize that our

model does not explicitly account for other possible factors that influence the relationship between
assortment variety and demand: the space devoted to a category and the presence or absence of
a favorite item influence the perception of variety (Kahn and Lehmann 1991, Broniarczyk et al.
1998) as well as a the arrangement, complexity and presence of repeated items in an assortment
(Hoch et al. 1999, Huﬀman and Kahn 1998, Simonson 1999).
Although research has primarily focused on single category choice decisions, there is recent
research that examines multiple category purchases in a single shopping occasion by modeling the
dependency across multi-category items explicitly (see Russell et al. 1997 for a review). Manchanda
et al. (1999) find that two categories may co-occur in a consumer basket either due to their
complementary nature (e.g., cake mix and frosting) or due to coincidence (e.g., similar purchase
cycles or other unobserved factors). Bell and Lattin (1998) show that consumers make their store
choice based on the total basket utility. Bodapati and Srinivasan (1999) relates feature advertising
to store traﬃc eﬀects using a nested logit framework. In these papers and in ours, consumers first
assign a utility to an anticipated market basket and subsequently use this utility to determine store
choice.
Fixed costs for each store visit (e.g., search and travel costs) provide an intuitive explanation
for why consumers basket shop.

Bell, Ho and Tang (1998) use market basket data to analyze

consumer store choices and explicitly consider the roles of fixed and variable costs of shopping. We
do not explicitly derive optimal baskets - we take them as given.
A number of recent papers study assortment selection and stocking decisions for a group of
substitutable products in a single category (e.g., van Ryzin and Mahajan 1999, Mahajan and
van Ryzin 2001, Smith and Agrawal 2000, Kok and Fisher 2004) and several papers focus only on
stocking decisions (e.g., McGillivray and Silver 1978, Parlar 1988, Netessine and Rudi 2003). Unlike
our paper, they assume store traﬃc is exogenous.

Agrawal and Smith (2003) study assortment

selection and inventory optimization with consumers that purchase sets of complementary items
(e.g., shirt and tie, only shirt, skirt and blouse, etc.). These papers do not consider simple heuristics
nor compare their centralized decision making regime to a decentralized regime.
We use game theory to study competitive interactions in our CM (decentralized) regime. Gruca
and Sudharshan (1991) and Basuroy and Nguyen (1998) study a market share game based on the
Multinomial Logit (MNL) model and demonstrate that certain conditions are needed for equilibrium
6

to exist. Although our model of consumers’ product and store choice is based on a nested MNL
model, our retailer’s share equation has the same form as a Multiplicative Competitive Interactions
(MCI) model. Karnani (1985) studies an MCI market share model with several firms that compete
in a single market through several marketing decisions, including price.

Existence of equilibria

is not guaranteed in his model, because the profit function of a single firm is not jointly concave
in the marketing variables. Our model is similar to his, however we have several customer types
corresponding to several markets and we do not include price as a choice variable. Finding the
centralized solution in our model with a single customer type corresponds to finding the best
response of a firm in Karnani’s model and we show that this is not straightforward. Monahan
(1987) studies a model in which two firms compete with each other in several markets under an
MCI model with a single marketing variable. Our model also has several markets, but the retailer’s
shares in diﬀerent markets (customer types) are interdependent and multiple marketing variables
(i.e., variety levels in all categories) play a role in each market. Netessine and Zhang (2004) show
that decentralized retailers selling strategic complements carry less inventory than optimal. We
show that CM provides less variety than optimal in the presence of basket shoppers even though
the interactions among categories in our model are not always strategic complements.

3

Consumer Choice

Our consumer choice model is based on a nested Multinomial Logit (MNL) framework. A consumer
chooses between the retailer and the outside alternative based her expected utility with each option.
Her total utility at the retailer (or the outside alternative) is the sum of her utilities from each
category in her basket.
In merchandise category j, a consumer’s utility from purchasing variant i in category j is uji =
vji + ε where ε are i.i.d. according to a Gumbel distribution with zero mean and variance π2 µ2 /6,
¤
£
i.e., F (y) = exp −e−(y/µ+γ) , where γ is Euler’s constant (γ ≈ 0.5722). Without loss of generality,

we order the variants in a category in decreasing expected utilities, i.e., vj1 ≥ vj2 ≥ .. ≥ vjIj . Let

U(Xj ) be a consumer’s utility from the purchase of one variant in category j with assortment Xj ,
i.e., U(Xj ) = max{uji : i ∈ Xj }. Because the Gumbel distribution is closed under maximization,
P v /µ
U(Xj ) follows a Gumbel distributed with mean E[U(Xj )] = µ ln
e ji and scale parameter µ
i∈Xj

(Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). The analogous results follow for the outside alternative.

Consider a consumer type with a single category basket, i.e., Bt = {j}. From the MNL formula,
7

the probability the consumer chooses the retailer over the outside alternative is
st (Xj ) =

exp (E[U(Xj )]/µ)
Aj (Xj )
=
,
exp (E[U(Xj )]/µ) + exp (E[U(Zj )]/µ)
Aj (Xj ) + Aj (Zj )

Now consider a customer with a multi-category basket.
P

Aj (Xj ) =

X

evi /µ . (1)

i∈Xj

Her total basket utility is Lt (X) =

U(Xj ), the sum of the utilities of the categories in her basket. Lt (X) is not Gumbel because

j∈Bt

the Gumbel distribution is not closed under addition. The store choice probability of the consumers
can not be specified in closed form with the true distribution of Lt . To be able to use the MNL
formula, we show in Appendix B that the distribution of Lt can be approximated with a Gumbel
distribution. (In particular, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the maximum distance between the
two distributions, is fairly small across diﬀerent parameter values.) As for empirical support, Bell
and Lattin (1998) use the MNL framework to estimate the basket utilities from consumer basket
data and report their model fits the store choice data well.
Let Gt (X) be a Gumbel random variable whose mean and variance are the same with Lt (X),
i.e.,
E[Gt (X)] =

X

µ ln

j∈Bt

X

evji /µ = µ ln

i∈Xj

Y X

evji /µ

j∈Bt i∈Xj

p
and V (Gt ) = |Bt |πµ2 /6. Hence the scale parameter of Gt is µ |Bt |. Consumer type t chooses the
maximum of Gt (X) and Gt (Z) to decide where to shop, and from the MNL share formula
st (X) =
where



At (X) = exp  µ ln

Y X

At (X)
At (X) + At (Z)

evji /µ

j∈Bt i∈Xj

Rewrite the share formula:

st (X) = Q

j∈Bt

Q

,

(2)


Y
p
√1
Aj (Xj ) |Bt |
µ |Bt | =
j∈Bt

√
Aj (Xj )1/ |Bt |

j∈Bt

√
√
Q
Aj (Xj )1/ |Bt | +
Aj (Zj )1/ |Bt |

(3)

j∈Bt

The MNL and the Multiplicative Competitive Interactions (MCI) models are presented as alternative formulations in text books and the choice between them depends on the particular application. Our share formula, (3), has the form of a MCI model although our consumer choice model
is a nested MNL model.
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4

Analysis

In this section, we present a game theoretic analysis of category management (CM), which is
our representation of the decentralized regime because each category manager seeks to maximize
her own profit.
regime).

We also characterize the optimal solution for the retailer (i.e., the centralized

The analysis of the CM game is complex because the best response functions are not

monotone.

Nevertheless, we provide equilibrium existence conditions and we characterize the

equilibria.

The centralized regime is also not well-behaved, yet we are able to provide some

structure and monotonicity results.
The expected profit in category j is
P

πj (X) = pj

t|j∈Bt

λt st (X) − Cj (Xj )

Proposition 1 The retailer’s optimal assortment in category j is of the type {0, 1, 2, .., xj } where
xj ∈ {1, .., Ij }.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.

Consider two products i and k where i < k.

Suppose

k ∈ Xj and i ∈
/ Xj and let Xj0 = Xj ∪ {i}\{k} Since vi ≥ vk , Aj (Xj0 ) > Aj (Xj ). We also have

Cj (Xj0 ) = Cj (Xj ), because |Xj0 | = |Xj |. Hence πj (X1 , .., Xj0 , ..XN ) ≥ πj (X1 , .., Xj , ..XN ).

van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) prove the same result for a single category by explicitly modeling
the inventory costs of each product in a newsvendor framework. As a result, we can think of the
variety decision in each category in terms of the number of variants in the category, xj (as opposed
to a set of variants). The analogous result holds for the outside alternative, zj .
Redefine the attractiveness and share functions with these new decision variables. The variety
levels at the retailer and the outside alternative are x = (x1 , x2 , .., xJ ), and z = (z1 , z2 , .., zJ ) where
xj
P
evji /µ . The basket
xj and zj ∈ {0, 1, .., Ij } for all j. Aj : {0, 1, 2, ..} → < and Aj (xj ) =
i=1
√
Q
Aj (xj )1/ Bt and the retailer’s share is
attractiveness function is then At (x) =
j∈Bt

st (x) =

At (x)
At (x) + At (z)

(4)

Observe that Aj (xj ) is nonnegative, increasing and concave in xj . Similarly At (x) is increasing
and concave in xj for all j and t. Finally, we can rewrite the category profit function.
πj (x) = pj

P

t|j∈Bt

λt st (x) − Cj (xj ).
9

The assortment decision x is a vector of integers.

Hereafter, we work with the continuous

version of the problem: diﬀerentiability facilitates the derivation and presentation of the results
and allows comparative statics; and existence cannot be guaranteed under integrality constraints.

4.1

Category management

The common practice of category management (CM) is an example of a decentralized regime for
controlling assortment because each category manager is charged with maximizing profit with his
or her assigned merchandise category. Since basket shoppers’ store choice decision depends on
the variety levels of other categories, category j’s optimal variety level depends on the vector of
variety levels of the other categories denoted x−j (i.e., x−j = (x1 , .., xj−1 , xj+1 , .., xN ). Hence a
game theoretic situation arises where category j employs a best response, defined as follows: the
strategy xj (x−j ) is category j’s best response to x−j if
©
ª
xj (x−j ) = arg max πj (xj , x−j ), s.t. 0 ≤ xj ≤ Ij , ∀j

(CM)

xj

Category managers do not actually need to know the λt parameters and the definition of the st
functions. We expect them to find the variety level that maximizes the category profits (i.e., the
best response function) given other categories’ variety levels. They would estimate a demand funcP
λt st (x) and then solve a single variable concave optimization
tion, say dj (xj ), as a proxy for
t|j∈Bt

problem to find xj (x−j ). Note that dj (xj ) depends on the variety levels of other categories.

CM can be interpreted as an explicit non-cooperative game between the category managers,
because each category manager is responsible exclusively for the profits of her own category. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as an iterative application of single category planning where each
category’s variety level optimized assuming all other assortment decisions for the retailer are fixed.
The following theorem establishes the existence of equilibrium and lays the groundwork for further
analysis.

Theorem 2 (Existence) A Nash equilibrium in the CM game exists and any Nash equilibrium is
characterized by the following conditions.
P

t|j∈Bt

pj λt

∂st (x)
− Cj0 (xj ) = 0, j = 1..N.
∂xj
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(5)

Proof. Define πjxj (x) ≡ ∂πj (xj , x−j )/∂xj and π jxj xk (x) ≡ ∂ 2 πj (xj , x−j )/∂xj ∂xk :
πjxj (x) =
πjxj xj (x) =

P

pj λt

∂st (x)
− Cj0 (xj )
∂xj

(6)

pj λt

∂ 2 st (x)
− Cj00 (xj )
∂x2j

(7)

t|j∈Bt

P

t|j∈Bt

As shown in Appendix C, At (x) is concave in xj ; therefore st (x) is concave in xj , for all t. Also
Cj00 (xj ) ≥ 0 by assumption. Consequently, the category profit πj (x) is concave in xj . Existence of
an equilibrium follows from Theorem 1.2. in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
Although an equilibrium exists, numerical examples show that there can be multiple equilibria
even in the N = 2 case.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate examples with one and three equilibria

respectively. We also found examples with multiple equilibria for N > 2.
The shape of the reaction functions xj (x−j ) helps us to understand the dynamics of the game
from each category’s perspective. From (5) and the Implicit Function Theorem,
,
P
P
∂xj (x−j )
∂ 2 st (x)
∂ 2 st (x)
=−
pj λt
pj λt
− Cj00 (xj )
∂xk
∂xk ∂xj
∂x2j
t|{j,k}⊆Bt
t|j∈Bt

The denominator is always negative, therefore the sign of ∂xj (x−j )/∂xk depends on the sign

of ∂ 2 st (x)/∂xk ∂xj for all t : {j, k} ⊆ Bt .

We see from Equation (11) in Appendix C that

∂ 2 st (x)/∂xk ∂xj < (>)0 when At (z) > (<)At (x).

Remark 3 i) For each category pair (j, k), <N can be divided into three regions: j and k are
+
−
+
, substitutes in Xjk
, and the relation is indeterminate in <N − (Xjk
∪
strategic complements in Xjk
T
T
−
+
−
Xjk
). ii) Let X + =
Xjk
and X − =
Xjk
. Clearly {x ≤ z} ⊆ X + and {x > z} ⊆ X − .
j,k∈J

j,k∈J

n
o
Q
Q
Proof. i) Define Xt+ = x ∈ <N , j∈Bt Aj (xj ) < j∈Bt Aj (zj ) . Xt+ is the region where the retailer is less attractive to type t consumers than the outside alternative Observe that in Xt+ , At (z)−

+
+
= {x ∈ Xt+ , ∀t|{j, k} ⊆ Bt }. In Xjk
, πjxj xk (x) is positive, hence πj (x) is superAt (x) > 0. Let Xjk
n
o
Q
Q
−
modular in (xj , xk ). Similarly define Xt− = x ∈ <N , j∈Bt Aj (xj ) > j∈Bt Aj (zj ) and Xjk
=

−
+
−
, πj (x) is submodular in (xj , xk ). Notice that <N − (Xjk
∪ Xjk
)
{x ∈ Xt− , ∀t|{j, k} ⊆ Bt }. In Xjk

is not empty, unless there is only one shopping basket with j and k in it. The sign of πjxj xk (x)

is indeterminate in this region. ii) Note that in vector notation {x ≤ z} = {x|xj ≤ zj for all j}.
+
−
, ∀j, k. Hence {x ≤ z} ⊆ X + . Similarly, {x > z} = {x|xj > zj for all j} ⊆ Xjk
for
{x ≤ z} ⊆ Xjk

all j, k. Hence {x ≥ z} ⊆ X − .
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In theoretical models with multiple activities, usually one type of interaction (either complements or substitutes) is assumed to hold everywhere or is found to hold everywhere.

In our

model however, the type of interaction between the categories depends on the attractiveness of
all the shopping baskets that contain these two categories, which in turn depends on the variety
levels of categories j, k, and other categories that co-exist in the shopping baskets with j and
k.

In the N = 2 case, since there is only one basket type with both j and k in it, we can tell

exactly the sign of ∂xj (x−j )/∂xk in any region in <2 . The categories are strategic complements
if Aj (xj )Ak (xk ) < Aj (zj )Ak (zk ) and substitutes otherwise. As our analysis suggests, the reaction
functions in Figure 1 are increasing-decreasing in the other category’s variety level. However, we
can not partition the action space as clearly in the N > 2 case, because we do not know the slope
+
−
∪ Xjk
). Nevertheless, Remark (3) characterizes two
of the best response functions in <N − (Xjk

distinct regions: In the first region (X + ), all categories are strategic complements, we can say more
about the game and its’ characteristics by using the theory of supermodular games. In the second
region (X − ), all categories are strategic substitutes.
Theorem 4 (Restricted game) Redefine the action space of the category management game (CM)
such that each category’s profit maximization problem is
©
ª
max πj (xj , x−j ), s.t. 0 ≤ xj ≤ zj , ∀j
xj

(CM_R)

i) This game is supermodular. The equilibrium set is non-empty and has a largest and a smallest
element.

The largest element is the Pareto best and the smallest element is the Pareto worst

equilibrium. The largest and the smallest equilibria are increasing in p and λ and decreasing in
z and c.

ii) In a symmetric game where data for all categories are identical, there exists only

symmetric equilibria.
Proof. i) The feasible action space {0 ≤ x ≤ z} is a non-empty, convex and compact set. The
payoﬀ function πj (x) is supermodular in all pairs of variables in {x ≤ z} ⊆ X + from Remark (3).

Supermodularity of πj in (xj , xk ) for all j, k implies that πj (xj , x−j ) has increasing diﬀerences in
{0 ≤ x ≤ z}. Therefore (CM_R) is a supermodular game. The payoﬀ function πj is continuous
in xj for each x−j in {0 ≤ x ≤ z}. Then by Theorem 4.2.1. of Topkis (1998), the set of equilibrium
points is a non-empty complete lattice and a greatest and a least equilibrium point exist. Since
∂πj (x)
≥ 0 for all k 6= j, the
the payoﬀ to a player is increasing in other players’ strategies, i.e.,
∂xk
largest element is the Pareto best and the smallest element is the Pareto worst equilibrium. This
12

result follows from a simple step-wise improvement argument, see Section 2.2.3. of Vives (1999).
We parameterize the game (CM_R) by (p, λ, −z, −c). It is easy to show that πj is continuous
in x−j for every (p, λ, −z, −c) and it has increasing diﬀerences in xj and p, λ, −z, and −c. By
Theorem 4.2.2. of Topkis (1998) we obtain the monotonicity results.
ii) The proof is by contradiction. Let x be an asymmetric equilibrium with xj > xk for some
j and k. By definition of equilibrium x satisfies (5) for all categories including j and k :
P

t|j∈Bt

pj λt

∂st (x)
− Cj0 (xj ) = 0 and
∂xj

P

t|j∈Bt

pk λt

∂st (x)
− Ck0 (xk ) = 0.
∂xk

Now,
∂st (xj , x−j )
∂st (xk , x−j )
∂st (x)
∂st (xk , x−k )
∂st (x)
=
<
<
=
∂xj
∂xj
∂xk
∂xk
∂xj
The first inequality follows from the concavity of st in xj and xj > xk . The second inequality follows
from the supermodularity of st () and x−j < x−k . Also we have pj = pk and Cj0 (xj ) ≥ Ck0 (xk ).
Hence the LHS of the equation for j is always strictly smaller than the one for k. As a result, both
conditions can not be satisfied at the same time and x can not be an equilibrium.
The action space defined in Theorem 4 is quite realistic under interpretation (I2) of the outside
alternative, because x < z implies that the retailer’s market share is less than half of the whole
market. Even in the original game with the unrestricted strategy space, if the cost of providing
variety is too high and all the equilibria are in X + , the results of Theorem 4 apply.
In a symmetric game, the categories have the same price, cost, competition, and demand vectors. Second part of the above Theorem rules out the asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game
(CM_R). The same result can also be established for the submodular region of the game (see part
3 of Proposition 11 in Appendix D), but we are only able to rule out asymmetric equilibria for the
whole game in the case of two symmetric categories.

Theorem 5 In the game CM with N = 2 and two categories are symmetric, there exists only
symmetric equilibria.

Proof. i) By the second part of Theorem (4) and part (iii) of Proposition (11), the only region
that can have asymmetric equilibria is <2 − {x ≤ z} − X − . This region is a subset of X + and it
is composed of two distinct parts on each side of the diagonal, denoted F1 and F2 (see Figure 3 for
illustration of these regions. Reaction functions are symmetric. If x1 (x2 ) passes through one of
13

F1 or F2 , x2 (x1 ) passes through the other and vice versa. Hence there cannot be an intersection
in either F1 or F2 .

4.2

Optimal solution

In the centralized system, total store profits are optimized over all category variety levels.
)
(
N
P
πj (x), s.t. 0 ≤ xj ≤ Ij , ∀j
(OPT)
max Π(x) =
x

j=1

Diﬀerentiate Π(x) with respect to xj .
N
X
X
X
∂Π(x)
∂st (x)
∂st (x)
=
pj λt
− Cj0 (xj ) +
pk λt
∂xj
∂xj
∂xj

(8)

k=1 t|j,k∈Bt
k6=j

t|j∈Bt

The marginal eﬀect of xj on the total profit is composed of its impact on own and cross category
sales. After reorganizing terms, the first order conditions for optimality are


X
X
∂st (x)

pk  λt
− Cj0 (xj ) = 0, ∀j
∂xj
t|j∈Bt

(9)

k∈Bt

The first order optimality conditions are based on the total profit earned from each customer
type, whereas the CM solution is based on the category profits.

Since st (x) is concave in xj ,

∂ 2 Π(x)/∂x2j < 0, for all j and t, and the first order condition (9) characterize the unique optimal
variety level xj for fixed x−j . However, we are not able to show that the joint optimization problem
is unimodular, therefore the system of equations ∂Π(x)/∂xj = 0 for j = 1, .., N is not suﬃcient
for optimality. It is easy to find numerical examples where Π(x) is not jointly concave, even with
N = 2.
We start the characterization of the optimal solution by describing two special cases of problems.
Note that Case A problems include all two category problems including the Case B problems.

Case A N categories. Basket types have the following property: |{Bt : j, k, l ∈ Bt }| ≤ 1 for all j, k, l
such that j 6= k, j 6= l, and k 6= l.
Case B N = 2. Symmetric categories.

All customers are basket shoppers (i.e., λt > 0 only for

Bt = {1, 2}). The products in a category are equally popular (i.e., Aj (x) is linear). Cost of

variety is linear (i.e., Cj00 (x) = 0).
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Theorem 6 Consider the special case A. i) If a symmetric solution to the first order conditions
p
−1
of OPT (9) satisfies At (x) > 2τ
2τ +1 At (z) where τ = 1/ |Bt | for any t, it is a local optimal solution

and can not be part of a continuum of local optima. ii) There exist at most one symmetric solution
to (9) in X − .

Proof. i) A suﬃcient condition for a stationary point to be a local maximum is that the Jacobian
of Πjxj = 0, j = 1..N is diagonally dominant, because a symmetric diagonally dominant matrix
with negative diagonal entries is negative definite (Corollary 7.2.3 of Horn and Johnson, 1985).
P
We need Πjxj xj (x) + k6=j |Πjxj xk (x)| < 0 and x ∈ X. Replace pj in the proof of Proposition
P
−1
11 with l∈Bt pl and show that diagonal dominance is achieved if At (x) > 2τ
2τ +1 At (z) is satisfied.

Hence, in this interval Π(x) is jointly concave at the symmetric stationary points. ii) Following the
same line of analysis we did for the game (CM), we can show that

∂Π(x)
∂xk ∂xj

< 0 in X − . Therefore,

the solution to the first order condition for category j for fixed x−j is decreasing in x−j in X − .
Decreasing reaction functions can intersect at the diagonal at most once.
Theorem 7 Consider the special case B. Focus only on the symmetric solutions x = (x, x). The
profit function is convex-concave in x, therefore either (0, 0) or the largest stationary point with
positive profit is the global optimal solution.
Proof. Total profit function is Π(x, x) = (p1 + p2 )x2τ /(x2τ + z 2τ ) − C1 (x) − C2 (x). The second
derivative is given by
¢
(p1 + p2 )2τ x2τ −2 z 2τ ¡ 2τ
x (−1 − τ ) + z τ (τ − 1)
2τ
2τ
3
(x + z )

whose sign is positive at x = 0, decreases with x, and is negative for large values of x. Hence the
profit function is convex-concave in x. The function is decreasing for large x, therefore there is a
local maximum in the concave part of the function, which is the global optimum if it yields positive
profit.
Similar to the decentralized solution, the theory of supermodularity enables us to characterize
the properties of the optimal solution and provide comparative statics for the restricted problem.
Theorem 8 (Restricted problem) Redefine the action space of the optimization problem (OPT) as
)
(
N
P
j
π (x), s.t. 0 ≤ xj ≤ zj , ∀j
(OPT_R)
max Π(x) =
x

j=1
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i) The set of solutions to the first order conditions (9) of OPT_R has a smallest and a largest
element that are monotone increasing in p and λ and decreasing in z and c. ii) The set of optimal
points arg max{Π(x), s.t., 0 ≤ xj ≤ zj , ∀j} is non-empty, has a smallest and a largest element that
are monotone increasing in p and λ and decreasing in z and c.
Proof. i) The existence of a largest and a smallest equilibrium and the monotonicity of the set in
the parameters follow from applying the theory of supermodular games to the first order optimality
conditions, similar to the proof of Theorem 4.

However, a stationary point may not be a local

maximum. ii) The result on the set of optimal points follow from the optimization of a supermodular
function (Theorem 2.8.3 in Topkis, 1999).

4.3

Comparison of the centralized and decentralized solutions

Let X cm be the set of Nash equilibria in the CM game. Similarly X o is the set of stationary points
of the optimal profit function, OP T. We assume the optimal solution is interior. The following
theorems show that CM never finds the optimal solution as long as there are basket shoppers.
Theorem 9 Suppose that there exists at least one consumer type with more than one category in
their basket and positive demand rate, i.e., |Bt | > 1 and λt > 0. i) The set of Nash equilibria
X cm in the category management game, CM, does not contain the global optimal solution to OPT.

X cm does not contain any of the local optimal solutions either. ii) If data is symmetric across all
categories, then there is a symmetric stationary point in X o greater than any symmetric equilibrium
in X cm (and it is a local optimum if it satisfies At (x) >

2τ −1
2τ +1 At (z)).

iii) Consider the special case

B. The optimal solution is greater than the largest symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. Compare the first order conditions to the optimization problem (OP T ) given by (9) and
the game (CM) given by (6):
Πxj (x)

− πjxj (x)

=

N
X

X

k=1,k6=j t|j,k∈Bt

pk λt

∂st (x)
>0
∂xj

if there is one basket type with more than one category and positive demand rate. Therefore, no
point x can satisfy both set of conditions, i.e., X cm ∩ X o = ∅. ii) For fixed vector of variety levels

of other categories, x−j ,the solution to the first order conditions for category j (xoj (x−j )) is always
larger than the best response of category j in the game (xcm
j (x−j )). In the symmetric game, let the
16

largest symmetric equilibrium have variety level xcm for all categories. It is suﬃcient to consider
cm cm
cm
o cm
an arbitrary category. We have xoj (xcm
−j ) > xj (x−j ) = x . We also know that xj (x−j ) does not

go to infinity since it is decreasing in X − . Therefore, xoj (xcm
−j ) will cross the 45 degree line at least
once more and the intersection is a stationary point of (OP T ), i.e., ∃x1 : xoj (x1−j ) = x1 > xcm .

iii) Follows from part (ii) and that the largest stationary point is the optimal solution in case B
according to Theorem 7.

Theorem 10 (Restricted Problem) Suppose that there exists at least one consumer type with more
than one category in their basket and positive demand rate, i.e., |Bt | > 1 and λt > 0. The global
optimal solution of the optimization problem OP T _R, xo , has strictly higher variety in at least one
category than any of the Nash equilibria of the game CM_R, including the Pareto best equilibrium,
cm ∈ X cm .
i.e., ∃j, xoj > xcm
j , ∀x

Proof. Let xo be the optimal solution to (OP T _R) and xcm be any equilibrium of the game
(CM_R). By contradiction, suppose that xo < xcm .
Π(xo ) =

X
j

πj (xoj , xo−j ) <

X
j

π j (xoj , xcm
−j ) <

X
j

cm
cm
πj (xcm
j , x−j ) = Π(x )

This is a contradiction with the optimality of xo . The first inequality follows from ∂π j (x)/∂xk ≥ 0
for all k 6= j and x, and the second inequality follows from the definition of the equilibrium, i.e.,
j
cm
xcm
j = arg maxxj π (xj , x−j ).

Note that CM and OPT would yield the same solution if all customers were single category
shoppers. Also, due to the supermodularity of the profit functions in the restricted strategy space,
discrete versions of Theorems 4, 8 and 10 are easily established with the following slight modification
in Theorem 10: the optimal solution provides greater than or equal to (not strictly greater than)
variety than the equilibrium solution in at least one category.
Figures 2 and 4 present pathological examples demonstrating some potential outcomes. Figure 2
shows that even the best of three CM equilibria provides significantly less variety than the optimal
solution.

In Figure 4 the unique CM equilibrium has the retailer eliminating both categories

although the optimal solution has positive variety in both categories.
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5

Properties of the Optimal and Equilibrium Assortments

In this section, we investigate the eﬀect of perturbations on the optimal and equilibrium solutions
and make inferences about how to allocate resources to categories. We assume the optimal solution,
xc , and the equilibria xd are an interior, so they are responsive to small parameter changes. We
classify categories into two types: A basket category has a high co-occurrence rate in baskets with
other categories; an independent category has most of its demand from single category shoppers.

5.1

Best collection of categories

Consider the scenario with N symmetric categories but focus on two categories j and k. Let
subscripts j and k denote the individual category shoppers of the respective categories. Also jk
denotes the consumers with shopping basket {j, k}. Given a variety level, the retailer’s share of
customers with individual categories is larger than its share of basket shoppers if and only if the
retailer provides less variety than the outside alternative: sj > sjk and sk > sjk if and only if xo < z.
Hence, the retailer prefers to have a higher proportion of basket shoppers among its customers of
categories j and k when xo > z (when its market share is greater than 50% of its potential). This
occurs because it is easier for a larger retailer to attract basket shoppers than a small retailer
(basket shoppers choose based on multiple categories rather than one). The result implies that a
retailer is better oﬀ with a collection of independent categories if xo < z and better oﬀ with basket
categories if xo > z. The situation a retailer is in probably depends on how the outside alternative
is interpreted. With interpretation I2, the outside alternative is the aggregate representation of
all the other firms, so the retailer probably has less than 50% of the whole market and is better
oﬀ with a collection of independent categories. With interpretation I3, the retailer probably has
more than 50% of its market potential, so the retailer prefers to carry basket categories. I3 is the
better interpretation if a retailer’s demand would increase by less than 100% if it were to carry a
full assortment in every category.

5.2

Which categories should have more variety?

Consider two categories with same total demand but one category is more of a basket category
than the other. In which category should the retailer provide more variety? Let subscripts j,k,
and l denote the individual category shoppers of the respective categories. Also jk and jl denote
the consumers with shopping baskets {j, k} and {j, l}, respectively. Suppose the demand rate of
18

all baskets with variant k are identical to those with l. The only exception is the rate of individual
category shoppers (λk and λl ) and basket shoppers of j and k or j and l (λjk and λkl ). Let
λk = Λ + δ, λjl = Λ − δ, λl = Λ − δ, λjl = Λ + δ where Λ ≥ δ ≥ 0. If δ = 0, categories k and l are
identical, as δ increases, demand to each category remains constant, l becomes more of a basket
category.
By the implicit function theorem, ∂xck /∂δ has the same sign as
¯
∂sjk (xoj , xok )
∂ 2 Π(x) ¯¯
0
o
=
p
s
(x
)
−
(p
+
p
)
j
k k k
k
∂δ∂xj ¯xo
∂xk

Similarly, xcl increase with δ if

pl s0l (xcl ) < (pj + pl )

∂sjl (xoj , xol )
∂xl

If categories k and l are symmetric, then as δ increases from zero, xok and xol move in reverse
directions. In §4.1, we showed that ∂ 2 sjl (xj , xl )/∂xj ∂xl > 0 if Aj (xj )Al (xl ) < Aj (zj )Al (zl ) and
> 0 otherwise. Hence ∂sjl (xj , xl )/∂xl is an increasing-decreasing function of xj . There may be
an interval of xoj say, (xoj ,xoj ), where the inequality is satisfied and ∂xol /∂δ > 0, i.e. the optimal
variety level of the basket category is higher than the optimal variety of the independent category.
For xoj < xoj and xoj > xoj , the reverse is true.

The intuition for this result is as following.

If

xj is too low, it is not possible to attract many basket shoppers by increasing the variety of the
basket category only, so it is better to increase variety in the independent category.

If xj is in

that interval, the basket category should be assigned more variety. As xj gets too large, there is
no need to increase variety in the basket category l because j’s variety level is already attracting
many basket customers to category l. To illustrate this result, we generated a series of numerical
examples by varying cj to control xcj .
Similar analysis yields that the equilibrium variety levels display the same properties. xcm incm cm
0 cm
cm cm
creases with δ when xcm
j ∈ (xj ,xj ) which is defined by the region pl sl (xl ) < pl ∂sjl (xj , xl )/∂xl .
cm
cm cm
With symmetric categories pl < pj + pk , hence (xcm
j ,xj ) ⊂ (xj ,xj ), i.e., there may be cases

where the optimal solution assigns more variety to the basket category and the category management solution does the reverse.

6

Category management with basket profits

The CM equilibrium solution emerges as the outcome of a natural iterative process: category
managers set variety levels, store traﬃc and sales are realized, category managers reassess the
19

demand function for their category and choose new assortments, etc. The same process occurs if
the retailer does category by category optimization. Either way, the process converges to one of
the CM equilibria. Despite its simplicity, we show in the next section that CM can significantly
deviate from the optimal solution. However, it is not easy to implement the centralized optimal
solution: that solution involves estimating the number of customers for all 2N basket types and an
N−dimensional optimization of an ill-behaved function.
In this section we introduce a decentralized heuristic that promises the best of both worlds (i.e.,
the simplicity of CM and a profit level close to that of the optimal solution). The main weakness
of CM is that it fails to recognize the intercategory eﬀects of variety decisions and underestimates
the marginal benefit of variety. As we have seen, the marginal benefit of variety is quite complex.
Consider basket shoppers that purchases from two categories, A and B.
A increases demand from these shoppers in both category A and B.

Increasing variety in
But more variety in A

may also warrant a change in the variety of B, depending on the current variety levels: variety
should be added to B if they are acting as complements and less if they are substitutes.

From

the perspective of the manager of category A, an additional sale is only worth pA , but from the
retailer’s perspective it is worth more. We approximate the true marginal benefit to the retailer
with the weighted average of the gross margins across basket types. We call this new metric basket
profits because it measures the total profit earned from a customer.

Specifically, let p̂j be the

basket profit from category j :
p̂j =

X

t|j∈Bt



λt

X

l∈Bt

,
X
pl 
λt
t|j∈Bt

The manager for category j is then measured with the following profit function:
π̂j (x) = p̂j

P

t|j∈Bt

λt st (x) − Cj (xj ).

Each CM then chooses variety
© j
ª
xB
j (x−j ) = arg max π̂ (xj , x−j ), s.t. 0 ≤ xj ≤ Ij , ∀j.

(CM_B)

xj

Note that all our results on the CM equilibria apply directly to the CM_B heuristic.

If we

compare the derivative of the CM’s profit function to the optimality conditions (9), we see that
P
CM_B uses a weighted average p̂j for all consumer types instead of using k∈Bt pk for consumer

type t. This approximation should work well if ∂st (x)/∂xj for all t are close to each other, however,
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even in symmetric category examples, ∂st (x)/∂xj varies with the basket size.

From a practical

perspective, note that the basket profit for each category is easily computed from POS data: it is
the average gross margin earned from customers who purchased a basket including that category.

7

Numerical Results

This section reports on numerical study that focuses on the magnitude of the profit loss due to CM
relative to the optimal solution and the performance of CM with basket profits.
Group 1: We generated 72 symmetric scenarios from all combinations of the following parameters:
p=1

zj = {5, 10}

Cj (x) = cj x

Aj (x) = x

N = {2, 3, 5}

cj = {2, 4}

Demand in each category is 100 units and demand is divided across baskets according to the basket
ratio vectors given in Table 1. For example, the vector {.2, .6, .2} for N = 3 means that 20% of
the demand goes to baskets of size one, 60% goes to baskets of size two, and 20% to baskets of size
three. For category 1, there are two baskets of size two, {1,2} and {1,3} and 60 units of demand
is equally divided among them. Hence, λ1 = 20, λ2 = 20, λ3 = 20, λ12 = 30, λ13 = 30, λ23 = 30,
and λ123 = 20.
The unique CM equilibrium has no variety in 12 out of the 72 scenarios, resulting in a 100%
profit loss relative to the optimal solution. In 21 scenarios there are multiple CM equilibria, one of
which was the zero equilibrium. In those cases we assumed the better equilibrium prevails. Table
2 presents summary data on the performance of CM: the average profit loss due to decentralization
is 28% and on average variety is 44% less than optimal. The performance of CM deteriorates with
more categories (N), higher outside variety (z), higher variety costs (c) and a higher proportion of
basket shoppers.
Group 2: To explore asymmetric categories, we focus on the N = 2 cases of Group 1. A total of
48 examples are generated from all combinations of zj ∈{5,10} and cj ∈{2,4} for the two categories,
i.e., 16 examples for each of the three basket types. The average CM loss is 8% in the asymmetric
examples in comparison to the 13% loss for the two symmetric category examples in Group 1.
Table 3 presents results for CM with basket profits (CM_B) in comparison to traditional CM
and the optimal solution for the examples with N = 2 from both Groups 1 and 2 and with N = 3
from Group 1.

Like CM, CM_B may lead to multiple equilibria.
21

We first consider the best

equilibrium of CM_B. The maximum loss with basket profits is only 2.1% and the average loss
is only 0.2%. Variety with basket profits is on average 4.6% higher than optimal. Furthermore,
CM_B works equally well for asymmetric and symmetric scenarios. One drawback of the basket
profits heuristic is that it could converge to a bad equilibrium in case of multiple equilibria. Table
3 shows that even the worst equilibrium of CM_B performs better than the best equilibrium of
CM (i.e., average profit loss for worst of CM_B is 8.5% whereas it is 13.2% for best of CM). The
reason for inferior performance is that all categories have zero variety in the worst equilibria in
our experiments (CM_B usually has a unique equilibrium in asymmetric examples, and as a result
performs well). Starting with a high variety level when a category is first introduced ensures that
CM_B (or CM) converges to the best equilibrium.

8

Conclusion

We study a retailer’s assortment planning problem with multiple categories and basket shopping
consumers that choose between the retailer and an outside alternative. We investigate the retailer’s
assortment decisions across categories under centralized and decentralized management regimes.
We find that variety levels between categories can be either strategic complements or strategic
substitutes. Nevertheless, we also find that decentralized assortment planning, as with category
managers responsible for their own category’s profit, is likely to lead to lower than optimal variety
and significantly lower profits than optimal. But a centralized optimal solution is almost surely not
implementable in practice due to the complexity of the required data estimation and optimization.
Therefore, we propose a decentralized regime, like category management, but instead of evaluating
each category manager’s accounting profit, we measure their basket profits, where basket profits are
estimated using point of sales data. We find that our basket profit approach provides nearly the
optimal variety and optimal profit. Hence, although the presence of basket shopping consumers is
known to create significant analytical complications for the assortment planning problem, a robust
and simple analytical solution exists.

A

Example of a replenishment system with convex operating cost

Consider a single category with x products and demand λ(x) = A(x) (A(x) + A(z))−1 where
P
A0 (x) > 0 and A00 (x) ≤ 0. Item i’s demand rate is λi (x), where i λi (x) = λ(x). Total shelf

space capacity is S and assume each item’s maximum inventory level is proportional to its demand
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rate, Si = Sλi (x)/λ(x). There are commercial algorithms that allocate shelf space in this way (see
Bultez and Naert 1988 for references). In a continuous review inventory system with zero lead time
an order is placed whenever the inventory level is zero and the average inventory level for a single
product is Si /2. Total average inventory is S/2, hence inventory holding cost is independent of x.
The number of orders per unit time for item i is λi (x)/Si (x) = λ(x)/S, i.e., the order frequency is
identical across all items. The total number of orders in the category is xλ(x)/S, whose second
derivative is
2λ0 (x) + xλ00 (x)
A(z)
(2A0 (x)((A(x) + A(z) − xA0 (x) + A00 (x)(A(x) + A(z)))
=
S
(A(x) + A(z))3
A(z)
≥
(2A0 (x)A(z) + A00 (x)(A(x) + A(z)))
(A(x) + A(z))3
The inequality is due to the concavity of A(x). A00 (x) ≤ 0 and A(0) = 0 implies A(x) ≥ xA0 (x).
If the x products have similar demand rates, A(x) is linear. A00 (x) = 0 and the cost function is
convex in x. With strictly concave A(x), the cost function is still convex if A(x) is not too concave.
For example, if A(x) = ln x, the sign of the second derivative is determined by A(z)(−1 + 2x) − ln x,
which is strictly positive for z ≥ e and x > 1.

B

Sum of two Gumbel distributed random variables

The sum of two Gumbel distributions does not have a closed form distribution function.

We

approximated the sum of Gumbel distributed random variables with a Gumbel distribution. Here
we discuss the quality of this approximation. One measure of similarity of two probability distributions is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance, which is the supremum of the distance between
the cumulative density functions. Consider the case with three Gumbel random variables, X,Y and
Z with parameters (ηX , µX ), (η Y , µY ), and (ηZ , µZ ). The mean of X + Y is ηX + ηY + γ(µX + µY )
and its variance is π2 µ2 /6. We set the parameters of Z to have the same mean and variance with
X + Y as follows.
µZ =

q
µ2X + µ2Y and ηZ = η X + ηY + γ(µX + µY − µZ )

K-S distance is
sup |FX+Y (u) − FZ (u)| ≈
u

max

p∈{0.01,..,0.99}

¯
¯
¯FX+Y (F −1 (p)) − p¯
Z

We computed FX+Y using numerical integration and searched for the maximum over percentiles
for the combination of the following parameters:
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η X = {10, 40}, η Y = {10, 40}, µX = {5, 20},

µY = {5, 20}. The K-S distance never exceeded 0.019 in these examples, which we believe is fairly
small. It is also of interest to note that the K-S distance seems to be eﬀected by only the ratio of
µX /µY but none of the other parameters, reaching the maximum at µX /µY = 1. Figure 5 provides
an example of the cumulative density functions of X + Y and Z.
Finally, from the perspective of our model, we are interested more in how the resulting choice
probabilities are aﬀected with the approximation.

Consider that X, Y, A, B are all Gumbel dis-

tributions, X + Y and A + B are approximated by Gumbels Z and C respectively. We compare
Pr{X + Y < A + B} and Pr{Z < C}. Notice that the latter one can be computed using the
MNL formula. For the combination of the set of parameters above, the maximum diﬀerence in
probabilities is 0.010, which is also fairly small and in the same order of magnitude with the K-S
distance. Table 4 presents a set of resulting choice probabilities with both the true distributions
and the Gumbel approximations.

C

Derivatives

√
Let τ = 1/ Bt , Φ = At (x) + At (z) and ∆ = At (z) − At (x). The first and second derivatives of the
attractiveness function are
∂At (x)
= I{j∈Bt } τ At (x)Aj (xj )−1 A0j (xj )
∂xj
¢
¡
∂ 2 At (x)
= I{j∈Bt } τ At (x)Aj (xj )−1 Aj (xj )−1 A0j (xj )2 (τ − 1) + A00j (xj )
2
∂xj
∂ 2 At (x)
= I{j,k∈Bt } τ 2 At (x)Aj (xj )−1 Ak (xk )−1 A0j (xj )A0k (xk )
∂xj ∂xk

The first and second derivatives of the share function are derived below.
∂st (x)
At (z)
∂At (x)
At (z)
= I{j∈Bt }
= I{j∈Bt } 2 τ At (x)Aj (xj )−1 A0j (xj )
2
∂xj
(At (x) + At (z)) ∂xj
Φ

24

Ã µ
!
¶
∂At (x) 2
∂ 2 st (x)
At (z)
∂ 2 At (x)
−2
=
+ (At (x) + At (z))
(At (x) + At (z))3
∂xj
∂x2j
∂x2j


´2
³
−1 A0 (x )τ
(x)A
(x
)
−2
A
t
j j
At (z)
j j
³
´
= I{j∈Bt } 3 
Φ
−1
−1
0
2
00
Aj (xj ) Aj (xj ) (τ − 1) + Aj (xj )
+Φτ At (x)Aj (xj )

¡¡
¢¢¢
At (z)At (x)Aj (xj )−1 ¡
−1 0
2
−1 0
2
00
(x)A
(x
)
A
(x
)
τ
+
Φ
A
(x
)
A
(x
)
(τ
−
1)
+
A
(x
)
−2A
t
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
Φ3
¢
At (z)At (x)Aj (xj )−1 τ ¡
−1 0
2
00
A
(x
)
A
(x
)
(−2τ
A
(x)
+
(−1
+
τ
)
Φ)
+
ΦA
(x
)
= I{j∈Bt }
j
j
j
t
j
j
j
Φ3
¢
At (z)At (x)Aj (xj )−1 τ ¡
−1 0
2
00
A
(x
)
A
(x
)
(Φ
−
τ
∆)
−
ΦA
(x
)
(10)
= −I{j∈Bt }
j
j
j
j
j
j
(At (x) + At (z))3
≤ 0.
= I{j∈Bt }

µ
¶
∂At (x) ∂At (x)
At (z)
∂ 2 At (x)
∂ 2 st (x)
−2
=
+ (At (x) + At (z))
∂xk ∂xj (At (x) + At (z))3
∂xk
∂xj
∂xk ∂xj
At (z)
= I{j,k∈Bt } 3 τ 2 At (x)Aj (xj )−1 Ak (xk )−1 A0j (xj )A0k (xk )(At (z) − At (x))
Φ

D

(11)

Statement and proof of intermediate step

Proposition 11 Consider the special case A. i) If CM symmetric equilibrium x satisfies At (x) >
.p
(2τ −1)
A
(z),
for
all
t
where
τ
=
1
|Bt | , then x can not be part of a continuum of equilibria. ii)
(2τ +1) t

The game CM has at most one symmetric equilibrium in X − . iii) If categories are symmetric and
there exists an equilibrium in X − , then it is the unique equilibrium in X − and it is symmetric.
Proof. i) As we mentioned before, the game (CM) has multiple equilibria, but we use the uniqueness conditions as an argument in our proof. Showing that a best reply map (xj (x−j ))j=1,..,N is a
contraction mapping is suﬃcient for a game to have a unique equilibrium. A suﬃcient condition
for a mapping to be a contraction is that the Jacobian of πjxj = 0, j = 1..N is diagonally dominant
(Section 2.5., Vives 1999), i.e.,
πjxj xj (x) +

X
k6=j

∂ 2 st (x)
pj λt
∂x2j
t|j∈Bt
P

− Cj00 (xj )

+

X

X

k6=j t|{j,k}⊆Bt

|π jxj xk (x)| < 0

¯ 2
¯
¯ ∂ st (x) ¯
¯
¯<0
pj λt ¯
∂xk ∂xj ¯

In the special case A, ∩k6=j {t|j, k ∈ Bt } = ∅, and ∪k6=j {t|j, k ∈ Bt } ⊆ {t|j ∈ Bt }. So there is
no baskets counted twice in the double summation.
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Hence, a suﬃcient condition for diagonal

¯
¯ 2
¯
(x) ¯
∂ 2 s (x)
dominance is to show that ¯ ∂∂xskt∂x
¯ < − ∂xt 2 for all t, j, and k. From (10) and (11), we see
j
j
¯
¯ 2
¯
(x) ¯
∂ 2 st (x)
,
∀t
may not hold in general. However, it holds when
that suﬃcient condition ¯ ∂∂xskt∂x
<
−
¯
∂x2
j
j

Aj (xj ) = Ak (xk ), A0j (xj ) = A0k (xk ), and (Φ − τ ∆) > τ |∆|. In X + , the last condition is equivalent
to At (x) >

(2τ −1)
(2τ +1) At (z)

(the coeﬃcient

(2τ −1)
(2τ +1)

is approximately 0.17. Therefore the proposition

applies to a large part of the strategy space. In X − , |∆| = −∆, (Φ−τ ∆) > −τ ∆ is satisfied. Notice
that the suﬃciency condition for diagonal dominance is achieved without using the nonnegative
terms −ΦA00j (xj ) and

∂ 2 st (x)
∂x2j

for t : j ∈ Bt , k ∈
/ Bt in the argument. Due to the slacks not used

in proving the suﬃciency condition and the continuity of all the terms, we can argue (or formally
prove) that diagonal dominance of the Jacobian is satisfied not only at the diagonal but also in an
ε neighborhood of the diagonal when ε is chosen suﬃciently small.
Using this result, we define new games on smaller compact N-cubes around the diagonal of
<N . Since the best response map is a contraction there is a unique equilibrium in that cube. The
implication of this result on the original game CM is that there cannot be a continuum of equilibria
or equilibria too close to each other around the diagonal.
ii) Since all the best response functions xj (x−j ) are decreasing in all components of x−j in
X − , if there is a symmetric equilibrium in X − , there can not be a larger symmetric equilibrium.
Therefore, there can be at most one symmetric equilibrium in the submodular region of CM.
iii) When categories are symmetric, since the reaction functions are decreasing, the only possibility to have multiple equilibria in X − is when there is a continuum of equilibria around the
symmetric equilibrium, (e.g., reaction functions with a slope of -1). But this is ruled out by part
(i).
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Figure 1.

A two category example with unique category management equilibrium.
N=2, symmetric categories, pj=1, Aj(x)=x, Cj(x)=cjx, cj=2, zj=5 for all j.
λ1=50, λ2=50, λ12=50.
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Figure 2.

A two category example depicting the three category management
equilibria and the optimal solution. N=2, symmetric categories, pj=1,
Aj(x)=x, Cj(x)=cjx, cj=2.8, zj=5 for all j. λ1=0, λ2=0, λ12=100.

Figure 3.

A two category example illustrating the regions relevant to the proof of
Proposition 5. N=2, symmetric categories, pj=1, Aj(x)=x, Cj(x)=cjx, cj=3,
zj=10 for all j. λ1=100, λ2=100, λ12=100.
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Figure 4.

A two category example depicting the unique category management
equilibrium at zero and the optimal solution. N=2, symmetric categories,
pj=1, Aj(x)=x, Cj(x)=cjx, cj=4, zj=10 for all j. λ1=0, λ2=0, λ12=100.
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Figure 5.

Cumulative density functions of the sum of two Gumbel random variables
and its Gumbel approximation. ηx=ηy=20, µx=µy=10.

Table 1.

Allocation of basket shoppers in numerical experiments. First entry in a
vector is the percentage of shoppers with a basket of size one, the second
entry is the shoppers with a basket size of two, and so on.

Proportion of basket shoppers

N=2

N=3

(.8, .2)

(.8, .2, 0)
(.5, .5, 0)

N=5
(.8, .2, 0, 0, 0)

low

(.5, .5, 0, 0, 0)
(.6, .2, .2, 0, 0)
(.2, .6, .2, 0, 0)

medium

(.5, .5)

(.2, .8, 0)
(.6, .2, .2)

(.2, .2, .6, 0, 0)
(.2, .2, .2, .2,.2)
(.2, 0, .6, 0, .2)

high

(.2, .8)

(.2, .2, .6)
(0, .2, .8)

(.2, 0, .2, 0, .6)
(0, 0, .2, .2, .6)

Table 2.

Summary of numerical results.

N
z
c
Proportion
of basket
shoppers

Table 3.

N

2
3
5
low
high
low
high
low
medium
high

Decrease in variety
level, 1 - xcm/xo
31%
41%
51%
34%
55%
34%
55%
20%
47%
66%

Performance of the category management (CM) and the basket profits
heuristic (CM_B) in comparison to the optimal solution. (B and W denotes
the best and worst equilibria of CM_B, respectively).

Data
Symmetric
2
Asymmetric
3
Symmetric
Average

Table 4.

Profit loss,
1 - Πcm/Πo
13%
23%
35%
14%
41%
14%
41%
4%
27%
51%

cm

1 - Π /Π
13.4%
6.8%
22.8%
13.2%

Average profit loss
B
o
W
o
1 - Π /Π
1 - Π /Π
0.2%
8.5%
0.1%
0.1%
0.3%
21.1%
0.2%
8.5%

o

Average deviation in variety levels
cm o
B o
W o
1 - x /x
1 - x /x
1 - x /x
30.6%
-4.7%
4.0%
26.5%
-3.9%
-3.7%
40.8%
-5.7%
15.5%
31.8%
-4.5%
4.0%

Resulting choice probabilities using the true distribution of the sum of two
Gumbel random variables and its multinomial logit approximation.
Mean
(X,Y)
(A,B)
(5,5)
(10,10)
(5,10)
(10,10)
(10,10)
(10,10)
(5,20)
(10,10)
(20,20)
(10,10)

Pr{X+Y>A+B}
TRUE
MNL
0.401
0.395
0.458
0.456
0.500
0.500
0.542
0.544
0.661
0.669

